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ALUMNI NOTES.
W. H. Taylor, '01, was admitted to the
Supreme Court on January 6th. He subse-
quently spent a few days in Carlisle and
has since located at Grand Encampment,
Wyoming. THE FORUM wishes him
abundant success.
A. Frank John, '00, spent several days
in town during the month. He has for
some time been located in Mt. Carmel,
and reports a fair share of business.
At a special meeting of the council of
the thriving borough of Renova, Pa.,
held Wednesday evening, February 12th,
W. E. Shaffer, 100, was unanimously
elected borough solicitor.
In the Birkbeck will case, which came
up in the Orphan's court of Luzerne coun-
ty recently, Daniel Kline, '01, was one of
the attorneys representing the niece, who
was ignored in the first will, but whose in-
terest in the estate under the last will
would be in the neighborhood of $40,000.
We are pleased to note that Mr. Kline has
been retained on a number of important
cases since his admission to the bar seven
months ago.
SCHOOL NOTES.
Rothermel, of the Junior class, has gone
to his home for the pre .ent, owing to
continued poor health. We trust he may
soon be enabled to return.
Benjamin, '04, has been appointed by
Judge Simonton as one of the viewers for
a bridge to be erected at Lackawanna,
near Scranton.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
°The adjournment of the congress con-
ducted by the Allison Society terminated
the longest continuous programme that
was ever conducted by that society. The
congress began in the latter part of Janu-
ary and remained in continuous session
until March 7th. During that time twelve
sessions were conducted, and six bills and
122 THU FORUM
about fifteen resolutions were passed.
Among the bills that were passed were
the following: Bill to increase the Army
and Navy; bill to purchase the Panama
Canal; bill to construct a cable between
San Francisco and Manilla; bill to exclude
the Chinese. Several other bills were
considered but were defeated on final
reading.
The adjournment of the congress brought
to a close one of the most instructive pro-
grammes that the Allison Society con-
ducted during the present term. It not
only imparted to the members a knowl-
edge of how the national congress is con-
ducted, but it gave them an excellent drill
in parliamentary training, and opportuni-
ties to debate subjects of national impor-
tance, subjects in which every citizen of
the United States is interested. That these
benefits were appreciated was demonstra-
ted by the hesitancy of the members to
adjourn the congress. At the last session
the advisability of continuing it for an-
other mouth was discussed, but, at request
of the executive committee, who have
other plans under consideration, the reso-
lution to adjourn the congress was adopted.
One of the instructive debates was that
on the Chinese Exclusion act. Crary,
Adamson, Willis, Carlin, Flynn, Yocum
and Spencer talked in favor of the bill;
Donahoe, Benjamin, Core and White
talked in opposition to it. The affirmative
won by a small majority. The arguments
of the negative were exceptionally strong.
They presented this interesting question
in a different light than that in which we
usually view it, appealing more to rea-
son than passion. The arguments were
logical and appealed strongly to the con-
servative minds. They received the argu-
ments from Mr. Wu, the Chinese minister
in the United States, with whom they
had correspondence.
The future sessions of the Allison will
not be routine. The executive committee
is preparing several programmes that will
be as inueresting as the congress.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The newly elected officers were installed
at. the meeting of March 7th. President-
elect Hickernell assumed the position of
president with the good will of the society
to support him. His inauguration speech
was brief, pointed and apropos. He out-
lined an administration which, if carried
out, bodes well for the future of Dickinson
Society. The program rendered at this
meeting, was, as usual, interesting and
well rendered. The regular debate was
dispensed with, on motion, as some of the
debaters were not present. This is a cir-
cumstance which is unfortunate, to say
the least. Members should be sufficiently
interested in the work to respond will-
ingly at the meetings, take their proper
part of the program and bear some of the
burden of the work. It is an evil in lit-
erary societies, that the work is apt to de-
volve upon a few. It is to be hoped that
members hereafter will at least notify the
executive committee that 'they cannot
serve. Time is too precious, and opportu-
nity too meagre to let both slip by with-
out an effort to grasp them and make the
most of them.
The meeting of March 14th was opened
by President Hickernell in the chair. The
society attendance was not beyond the
usual standard. The program was partly
carried over from the last meeting.
It seems to be a perplexing question
with our executive committee as to whom
to procure for a lecturer. It is so long since
we had a lecturer come before our society,
that everyone is expressing the desire
that arrangements be made to procure
a response to our invitation. We would
remind the executive committee that Dr.
Reed has promised to lecture to us again.
The annual inter-society debate between
Dickinson and Allison has not yet been
suggested in our meeting. It is our turn
to challenge Allison Is it possible that
it will fail to cometopass? We hopenot.
The large number of exchanges of the
Forum in the library should suggest to the
executive committee thatsomething of in:
terest might be culled from them to spice
our programs. Many of the articles found
in them would be interesting and instruc-
tive, if they were read as part of the pro-
gram.
The Juniors are taking a remarkable in-
terest in society work, and it is with
pleasure that we notice it.
A question which seems to bequite puz-
zling is "Where is the minute book?"
Committeemen Schanz and Morehouse
THE FORUM 123
failed to find any trace of it, and so re-
ported at the last meeting. Finder, please
return.
DELTA CHL
James B. O'Malley, Esq., of Cornell
University, and A. Frank Johns, Esq., of
Mt. Carmel, Pa., were banqueted in the
Chapter rooms here on their return from
the University of West Virginia, at
Morgantown, where they installed a new
chapter of the Delta Chi. Addresses were
delivered by the guests of honor, and also
by Prof. F. C. Woodward, Guy Thorne,
R. J. Boryer and William Osborne. Both
Mr. O'Malley and Mr.-Johns are officers
of the Grand Chapter, and they both are
pleased with the prospect for an influential
and prosperous Chapter in West Virginia.
Mr. Thorne was Dickinson's representa-
tive at the installation. It was during
the career of Messrs Boryer and Osborne,
of Dickinson, in the West Virginia Uni-
versity, that the organization of the new
Chapter was begun, and it will always be
regarded as an offspring of Dickinson.
Both the grand officers congratulated
Dickinson upon its flourishing condition
and upon the work it has been doing.
They reported that all the Chapters of the
Fraternity are enjoying unusual pros-
perity.
BOOK REVIEWS.
PENNSYLVANIA LAW OF CONVEYANC-
ING. By Christopher Fallon, of the Phil-
adelphia Bar. T. & J. W. Johnson &
Co., 1902, pp. xix, 909.
Mr. Fallon's work, based upon notes
taken for the author's own -use, and deal-
ing with the special features of the Penn-
sylvania law of conveyancing, must prove
a practical aid to the practitioner in this
state.
The author's aim as stated in the preface
is, " to bring together all the acts of the
assembly and decisions of the court, re-
lating to the transfer of real estate, and
arrange them in such a shape that the
busy practitioner might readily find the
law on any given point," and the puipose
has been successfully accomplished, both
as to matter and arrangement, by a lucid
and concise statement of the law, careful
discrimination in the selection of illustra-
tive cases, and the application of astute
analytical powers to a logical disposition
of material, making possible a highly sat-
isfactory and workable index.
The book contains over nine hundred
pages, including the excellent index, a
table of cases cited, and a chronological
collection of the acts of the assembly
quoted with reference to pages.
The work proper is divided into twenty-
five chapters, each with a carefully pre-
pared synopsis of paragraphs, and with-
out extended intrusion of personal theories,
covers very completely the ground set out
in the title.
The profession will find this exposition
of the fruits of Mr. Fallon's experience,
not only an excellent literary production,
but a valuable every-day reference book.
THE LAW OF WITNESSES IN PENNSYL-
VANIA.
The Pittsburg Legal Journal, of March
12th, in reviewing this recent work says,
"Professor Trickett has written a great
many text books on Pennsylvania Law
and they have been uniformly of a high
standard. The present work is one of the
best. As the title indicates, it is nota work
on the general Law of Evidence, but only
on the parts of the subject relating specially
to the witness, and is almost entirely
confined to the Competency of Witnesses,
and Opinion or Expert Testimony." After
quoting from the preface, the writer con-
tinues "Thework contains about 700 pages,
including a good index. The subject-mat-
ter is well arranged so that the exact point.
wanted may be readily found. The cita-
tions of cases are complete and the impor-
tant ones are given very fully so that a
reference to the report is usually unneces-
sary. It covers largely a new subject in
Pennsylvania law, and will be found to be
of great assistance in the trial of nearly
every case and in the settlement of claims
in the Orphans' Court."
The following is a continuation of the
Mfoot Court cases assigned:
Plaintiff Defendant
No. 91. Claycomb, Longbottom,
Miller, Watson.
Sherbine, J.
No. 92. Mowry, Hamblen,
Gross, Walsh.
Hickernell, J.
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No. 93. Lanard, Lourimer,
Shomo, Wilcox.
Schanz, J.
No. 94. Morehouse, Shiffer,
Brock, Adamson.
Davis, J.
No. 95. Conry, McIntyre,
Turner, Boryer.
Brooks, J.
No. 96. Spencer, Wilier,
Willis, Knappenberger.
Brennan, J.
No. 97. Kaufman, Fox,
Drumheller, Vastine.
Ebbert, J.
No. 98. Minnich, Sterrett,
Osborne, Rhodes, F.
Points, J.
No. 99. Thorne, Brooks,
Williamson, Hindman.
Laubenstein, J.
No. 100. Bouton, Keelor,
Schanz, Wright.
Walsh, J.
No. 101. Wilson, Wingert,
Oldt, Rothermel.
Vastine, J.
No. 102. Elhneg, Lonergan,
McKeehan, Points.
Aclamson, S.
No. 103. Albertson, Bradshaw,
Chapman, Jacobs, J. H.
Wright, 5.
No. 104. Flynn, Matthews,
Hugus, White.
Yeagley, J.
No. 105. Fleitz, James,
Hillyer,
No. 106. Rhodes, J. Moon,
Houser, MacConnell.
Brock, J.
No. 107. Brennan, Delaney,
Miller, Myers.
Hindman, J.
No. 108. Hubler, Lloyd,
Benjamin, Carlin.
Kline, 3.
No. 109. Mowry, Jones,
Peightel, Cooper.
Bishop, J.
No. 110. Phillips, Drumheller,
Sherbine, Cisney.
Schnee, J.
No. 111. Claycomb, Mays,
Longbottom,
Peightel, J.
No. 112. Berkhouse, Houck,
Lanard, Shiffer.
Drumheller, J
No. 113. Crary, Mowry,
Cannon, Schnee.
MacConnell, J.
No. 114. Davis, Tuiner,
Laubenstein, Boryer.
Osborne, J.
No. 115. Dever, Kline,
Core, Ebbert.
Bouton, J.
No. 116. Kaufman, Yeagley,
Walsh, 'Watson.
Myers, J.
MOOT COURT.
THOMAS vs. HARVEY.
Receipt by check--Recital "payment in
full"-Prima facie and not conclusive
evidence of settlement-Duty to investi-
gate records-Fraud.
SCHNEE and WILLIAMSON for the plain-
tiff.
A receipt, "in full," is not conclusive,
but only prima facieevidence of payment.
Batdorf v. Albert, 59 Pa. 59; Flynn v.
Hurlock, 194 Pa. 462.
Dixon had sufficient notice of the prior
mortgage to cause him to investigate and
he is bound by whatever his investigations
would have disclosed. Murphy v. Nathan,
46 Pa. 508; Uhler v. Hutchinson. 23 Pa.
110.
STAUFFER and WANNER for the defen-
dant.
A receipt in full is conclusive when
given with a knowledge of all the circum-
stances. Tucker v. Murray, 10 Lane. 235;
Fowler v. Smith, 153 Pa. 639; Smith v.
Cohn,170 Pa. 132.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Sloan Thomas loaned Harry Harvey
$2,000.00, receivingas security a first mort-
gage on the realty of Harvey. One year
after loan of $2,000.00, Harvey desiring to
secure an additional $1,000.00, applied to
Dixon, who agreed to loan him $3,000.00
on condition of his paying Thomas
$2,000.00 in satisfactioh of his mortgage
and giving Dixon a first mortgage for the
$3,000.00. At Harvey'ssuggestion, Dixon
gave him a check for $1,$00.00, payable to
Thomas, in full payment of his mortgage.
Harvey told Dixon that he had $500.00 in
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cash, intimating that he would use that
in conjunction with the $l,500.00 to sat-
isfy Thomas' claim.
Harvey gave the check for $1,500.00 to
Thomas who, apparently unmindful of
the stipulation that it was in full payment
of mortgage, had check cashed ; it was re-
turned to Dixon, who, upon its receipt,
paid to Harvey the remaining $1,500.00.
Harvey never paid Thomas the balance
of $500.00 due on mortgage, hence Thomas
never satisfied the mortgage.
Thomas' mortgage still of record, Dix-
on's mortgage became a second lien on
the land and his claim was inferior to that
of Thomas. The Jemaining $500.00 being
unpaid, Thomas in order to secure it sued
out a writ of scirefacias, and caused land
ta be sold. At the sale Dixon, in order to
secure his interest, bid $3,000.00; land sold
on his bid.
In the distribution Dixon claimed the
whole of the $3,000.00, since it represented
the amount of his claim against the land.
The question to be decided is whether
Thomas, having accepted a check for
$1,500.00, purporting to be in full payment
of mortgage, is entitled to $500.00 of the
proceeds of the sale, "balance due on his
mortgage of $2,000.00 ;" or whether Dixon
is entitled to the whole of the $3,000.00.
It seems clear from the facts in the case,
that it was the intention of Harvey to de-
fraud Thomas. He represented to Dixon
that he would pay Thomas, by the check
for $1,500.00 and $500.00 in cash, the full
amount of the mortgage. There is abso-
lutely no evidence of an agreement be-
tween Thomas and Harvey whereby
Thomas waived a part of the $2,000.00 due
him on his mortgage.
A receipt in full is primafacie evidence
of a settlement, but not conclusive. It
may be attacked on the ground of fraud,
mistake or ignorance of his legal rights in
the party who gave it, is the principle laid
down in Hamsher v. Kline, 57 Pa. 397.
It is held in Hartman v. Danner, 74 Pa.
36, that payment of part of a debt, though
received in satisfaction, if without a re-
lease under seal, will not have the effect of
extinguishing the whole. This principle
is also laid down in the following cases:
Lowrie v. Verner, 3 Watts319; Megargel's
Adm. v. Megargel, 105 Pa. 475.
In Clark on Contracts, page 189, we find
that the simple payment of asmaller sum,
in satisfaction of a larger, is not agood dis-
charge of a debt, for it is doing no more
than the debtor is already bound to do,
and is therefore no consideration for the
creditors promise to forego the residue.
The only exceptions are gifts and releases
under seal, these are based on the fact that
in addition to the part payment there is
some new benefit or consideration, even
though slight, to sustain the creditor's
promise to forego the residue of the debt.
Where the creditor agrees with the
debtor to accept a lesser amount in satis-
faction of his claim, the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction applies. But as a general
rule the doctrine of accord and satisfac-
tion rests upon a mutual agreement be-
tween the parties.
There must be an aggregatio mentium.
Parsons on Contracts, 6th ed. 685.
Where a note or a check of a third per-
son constituted the consideration, it was
held in Lauer v. Getzer, 3 Sup. 461,
"Where the creditor accepts the note of a
third person in payment of his debt, a no-
vation takes place. Mere acceptance of
the note does not constitute a novation
without evidence that it was taken in sat-
isfaction of the debt, In all cases the bur-
den of proof is upon the party asserting
the novation.
The facts within my possession fail to
show any evidence of an agreement be-
tween Thomas and Dixon whereby a no-
vation was created, since the burden of
proof to show such novation was on the
defence. In my opinion the defence failed
to establish the novation.
In most cases cited by the defence, it
was manifest that there was an accord and
satisfaction. In the absence of such
agreement in this case, I am unable to see
the relevancy of the cases cited.
It was held in Economy Coal Company
v. Bracewell, 78 Ill. App, 235. "One who
accepts a payment tendered to him in full
satisfaction of his claim, is estopped from
claiming thereafter a balance on such
claim." But it rests on the party setting
up estoppel to show grounds upon which
it rests. Wood v. Bullard, 151 Mass. 331.
One of the grounds to be shown, would be
knowledge of the creditor to be estopped.
From the facts as presented in this case, I
am convinced there was no agreement be-
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tween Thomas and Harvey whereby
Thomas should accept $1,500.00 in full sat-
isfaction of his mortgage for $2,000 00.
This is made clear by Harvey's represen-
tation to Dixon as to $500.00 cash that he
intended to apply to Dixon's check for
$1.500.00. Thomas' attitudein the matter
clearly proves that his acceptance of the
check was due to an oversight on his part,
in failing to notice that it was stipulated
that the amount was in full payment.
Thomas being the first mortgagee, his
mortgage remaining unsatisfied, the bal-
ance due on it was still a first lien on the
land, notwithstanding the representations
and promises made by Harvey.
Granting that Mr. Thomas was negli-
gent in accepting a check marked in full
payment of his mortgage, when it lacked
$500.00 of being tie amount of the mort-
gage. Mr. Dixon was negligent in a
greater degree, since he reposed the utmost
confidence in the statements of Mr. Har-
vey, and relying solely upon them, he
advanced $3,000.00 on security which he
now comes before the court and asks to be
construed in his favor, to the detriment
of one entitled to the protection of the
court.
The court records are open to our in-
vestigation. When one buys realty it
devolves upon him to secure himself as to
the validity of the title he is about to
acquire; likewise, when one wishes to
place money out on interest, he must
ascertain the worth of the security he is
about to receive. If he neglects to make the
necessary examination and relies upon the
representations of others, he does so at his
own peril, and on an occasion such as is
presented in the case we are now consider-
ing, it is unreasonable to ask the court to
protect one against loss occasioned by his
own negligence.
It is a principle deeply rooted, "when
one of two innocent parties must suffer
for the wrongful act of a third party
he must suffer who put it in the
power of such third party to do the
wrong." In this case it isaquestion as to
who should suffer for the wrong of Har-
vey, since Dixon put it in the power of
Harvey to do the wrong he should suffer
the loss rather than Thomas.
Mr. Dixon was grossly careless in not
insisting upon an actual satisfaction of
Thomas' mortgage on record, or a power
of attorney to satisfy the mortgage. Since
he was content with the returned check,
and Mr. Harvey's representations. I am
satisfied that Mr. Dixon should suffer the
loss occasioned by the fraud of Mr. Har-
vey.
Judgment is therefore entered in favor
of the plaintiff for the sum of Z.500.00, and
against the defendant.
HINDMIAN, J.
ELECTRIC LIGHT CO. vs. THORPE.
Electric Light Co.-Placing of poles-In-
junction-Burden of proof as to servi-
tude.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The Borough of Ephrata was already
supplied with light by an electric light
company under a contract to light the
streets for four years. Meantime, the
plaintiff company was incorporated and
obtaining the consent of the council, pro-
ceeded to plant its poles and stretch its
wires. Its charterauthorizedit to furnish
light to the borough and its inhabitants.
In front of Thorpe's house were already
two poles of the former company, and one
of a trolley company. The plaintiff is un-
dertaking to plant another pole in front of
his house, and he has removed it three
times. Hereupon an injunction is asked
by the company against the further inter-
ference with the pole.
He answers, (1) That the borough being
already supplied with light, the plaintiff's
planting of the pole is taking an easement
for a non-public use; (2) The planting of
an additional pole before his house is op-
pressive and discriminates against him be-
cause it. could be as conveniently, for the
company, planted elsewhere. The plain-
tiff demurs to the answer.
CHAPArAN and CORE for plaintiff.
The borough has the right to grantease-
mentson its streets. Trickett on Borough
Law, .395; Lockart v. Craig St. R. R., 139
Pa. 419. The injunction may be granted.
Haverford Light Co. v. Hart, 13 Pa. C. C.
369.
CARLIN and KEELOR for defendant.
An injunction is not allowable to re-
strain one from interfering with anything
that is going to damage his property.
Beiver v. Hurst, 162 Pa. 1; Richard's Ap-
peal, 57 Pa. 105 ; Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa.
274.
THE FORUM
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The one question of importance is in-
volved in the first point presented by de-
fendant. A case almost analogous is found-
in York Telephone Co. v. Keesey, 5 Dis-
trict Reports. An ordinance of the city
required telephone companies to obtain a
license before planting poles, to give di-
mensions of each and also intended lo-
cation. The company failed to do so and
planted one in front of property of defend-
ant, which he cut down. Subsequently
the company complied with the ordinance.
In the hearing for an injunction it was
held that under the circumstances, de-
fendant was justified in cutting them
down, but if plaintiff complied with city
ordinance, an injunction restraining de-
fendant from interfering would be granted,
the learned court saying:- "Poles and
wires of a telephone company impose no
additional servitude upon a street. Rights
of owners of abutting properties on a
public street are subject to paramount
rights of the public which are not limited
to a mere right of way but extend to all
beneficial, legitimate street uses of which
this is one. A telephone company is a
quasi-public corporation and must serve
every one who applies, on equal terms.
It is not a corporation for private business,
and there is, therefore, no constitutional
objection to its enjoying rights of eminent
domain."
A borough may permit erecting of poles
and wires along and across streets without
compensation to property owners and
exact from such company a license fee for
such privilege. Trickett Borough Law
See. 395, also Lockhart v. Street Railway
Co. 139 Pa. 419.
In case of Haverford v. Electric Co. 13
C. C. 369. The poles of plaintiff company
were placed in front of defendant's proper-
ty but within limits of the highway and
a few feet from defendant's fence line.
Defendant cut down the poles; company
replaced them and secured a preliminary
injunction to restrain him from further
interference with the poles. The court
saying "An electric light company may
plant their poles on the side of a country
road, abutting land owners are entilled to
such damages as they may sustain by
location of poles and wires."
In answer to the second point presented
by defendant, it does not work any more
hardship upon him than upon any other
property owner and does not appreciably
diminish the value of his property nor
does it discriminate against him. If he
can show additional servitude imposed up-
on him, he has his action at law. A per-
manent injunction restraining defendant
from interfering in any manner with
poles and wires of plaintiff company is
therefore granted.
LONGBOTTOM , J'.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The light company has the authority
of the state to erect poles on the streets of
Ephrata, upon obtaining the consent of
the borough council, and it has obtained
that consent.
The borough could have suspended its
consent on compliance by the company
with conditions as to height, thickness,
color of the poles, their closeness to each
other, the number that might be planted
before any man's premises, etc., but it does
not seem to have done so.
It seems, if we are to accept Russ v.
Pennsylvania Telephone Co. 3 D. R. 654,
that in addition to the conditions speci-
fied by the municipal council, the court
has a limited power to impose conditions.
McPherson, J., therr enjoined the com-
pany against planting a pole "in front of
any of the doors or windows of the plain-
tiff's building" then in course of erection,
after ascertaining, at a hearing, that the
pole might be placed equally advan-
tageously for the company, "a few feet
north or south of the point first chosen,
without interfering with the plaintiff's
windows or doors."
It is conceivable, with the increase of the
number of corporations supplying light,
locomotion, or intelligence, by means of
electricity within a borough, that a large
inumber of poles should be placed on the
land of one citizen, who might thus re-
ceive an undue share of the burdens. If
he can be subjected to four, he may also be
to forty. It seems reasonable that aftor a
certain charge has been placed on one man,
no more should be imposed unless it ap-
pears that the selection of another site for
the poles is not reasonably convenient.
Thorpe, having already three poles, thinks
that the fourth should be placed on some
other lot. If it could with substantially
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as much ease and convenience be placed
elsewhere, we agree with him that he
should not be compelled to suffer the addi-
tional burden.
But on whom is the burden of proof?
On Thorpe to show the practicability of
another location, or on the company to
show its impracticability. As the com-
pany can readily show if it be a fact that
no other site will be as convenient and use-
ful as Thorpe's premises, we think it
should be expected to do so. It asks the
court to enjoin Thorpe from protecting his
premises from what, primafacie, is an un-
due multiplication of servitudes, to the re-
lief of his neighbors. Let the company,
then, show that this multiplication is un-
avoidable, if the objects of the company
are to be efficiently accomplished. Until
it does so, it should not be aided by a chan-
cellor in imposing the fourth pole on
Thorpe's premises. Nothing in York Tel-
ephone Co. v. Keesey, 5 Dist. Rep. 366, is
inconsistent with this conclusion.
Decree reversed with procedendo.
PAUL SMITH'S ESTATE.
Divorce-Jurisdiction of courts of another
state-Appearance of defendant by at-
torney- Validity of the divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Smith married Sarah Jones, August 3,
1898, a year afterwards desiring to obtain
a divorce from her, he secretly went to
South Dakota whose laws allow divorce
to all libellants who have resided in the
State 90 days, for incompatibility of temper
and other causes. He intended to return
to Pennsylvania as soon as he had ob-
tained the divorce. Notice was given of
the proceedings to Mrs. Smith by letter,
by a deputy sheriff, of South Dakota,
who personally served the notice on her
in Reading, Pa., and by publication in a
South Dakota and Berks county newspa-
per. She directed an attorney of South
Dakota to appear and object to the court's
jurisdiction. The attorney did so, but
the court decreed a divorce nevertheless,
for incompatibility of temper.
Smith then returned to Pennsylvania
and married again. At his death 4 years
after, Sarah claimed as widow, $300.00 as
exemption, and one-half of the personalty.
The second wife claimed $300.00 and one-
third of the personalty, while the child by
the second marriage claimed two-thirds of
the personalty. The auditor awarded the
money to the second wife and child.
LANARD and MYERS for appellant.
A decree in divorce, granted by a court
of a foreign state, in which libellant only
lived a statutory period for the purpose of
procuring a divorce, will not be recognized
as valid by the courts of this state. Com.
v. Ainsworth, 6 Dist. Rep. 707.
Where the court has nojurisdiction over
the wife, and from said court the husband
obtained a divorce, the wife will have
dower. Calvin v. Reed, 55 Pa. 375 ; Reel
v. EIder, 62 Pa. 308.
LLOYD and Fox for appellee.
Appearance by attorney for respondent
at any stage of the proceedings gives juris-
diction of the person. 43 Hun. 461; 17
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1063.
Jurisdiction of defendant's person hav-
ing been obtained by her counsel, having
entered an appearance, it cannot be lost
by the withdrawal of the counsel after
issue joined. Wilson v. Hilliard, 17 W.
N. C. 325.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
That the injured party in the marriage
relation must seek redress in the forum of
the defendant unless the defendant has re-
moved from what was the common domi-
cile of both is well established as the law
of Pennsylvania; Reed v. Elder, 62 Pa.
308.
In Fyock's Estate, 135 Pa. 524, the court,
Patterson, Judge, held, "If a court has not
jurisdiction, neither notice nor process
duly served can give validity to its judg-
ments." The same rule is applied in Reel
v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308; Colvin v. Reed, 55
Pa. 375 ; Heslop v. Heslop, 82 Pa. 540, and
Commonwealth v. Maize, 23 W. N. C.,
572. In the latter case it was further
held, "If the defendant had cause 6f
action against his wife, he could have
proceeded in the courts of his and her
domicile. If he had cause of complaint it
was his duty to bring that complaint be-
fore the court having jurisdiction of the
person and the cause. To avoid this court
and seek a court in a foreign state isprima
facie evidence of a fraudulent motive on
the part of him who acts thus.
From the fact that the court had no
jurisdiction, it follows that the decree of
divorce pronounced by the court of South
Dakota, was a mere nullity, at least so far
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as its extra territorial effect was con cerned,
and did not alter the status of the parties
in Pennsylvania, unless Sarah Smith
(nee Jones) by her instructions to the
South Dakota attorney, and the said at-
torney's subsequent actions in pursuance
of such authority, had the effect of waiv-
ing the want of jurisdiction. Was any-
thingdone by Sarah Smith or her attor-
ney, which produced such a result? It
appears that Mrs. Smith directed an at-
torney of South Dakota, to appear and ob-
ject to the court's jurisdiction, and that
the attorney did so. Nothing in the facts
before us indicate that the attorney did
anything or took any step in the cause,
except to object to the want of jurisdic-
tion. He was simply instructed to appear
for a special purpose, viz., to object to the
court's jurisdiction.
Under the circumstances it would be
difficult to see how therespondent waived
the want of jurisdiction over her person
by expressly objecting to it. Can It be
successfully asserted that: by expressly ob-
jecting to the jurisdiction of a court, a
person thereby waives the want of juris-
diction? We think not. In 1 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of Law, page 184, the rule as
to an appearance for any particular pur-
pose is thus stated: "An appearance for
any particular purpose such as to take ad-
vantage of defects, is not a waiver of those
defects." By weight of authority it seems
to be established that an appearance for
moving to quash a writ for want of juris-
diction or insufficiency of service, does
not subject to the jurisdiction or waivethe
illegality; Hodges v. Brett, 4 Green (Ia.)
34.5; Wilburn v. Foutz, Id. 346; Johnson
v. Buetts, 26 Ill. 66; Camp v. Tibbetts, 2
E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 20. The precise point
in the case before us was ruled on in Stan-
ley v. Arnow, 13, Fla. 361, where it was
held that. "an appearance merely to ob-
ject, is not a waiver of want of jurisdic-
tion." In Warren Saving Bank v. Silver-
stein, 15 C. .585, it is said. "In otherjuris-
dictions, where appearance de bene esse are
unknown, motions to set aside the service
of the writ, or to quash it, are allowed, but
must be made before appearance, and
making such a motion is not an appear-
ance. In foreign attachment the court
has no jurisdiction of the person of the de-
feudant, except by his own voluntary ap-
pearance. Demanding the release of his
property as unlawfully seized, especially
when he expressly declares that he does
not intend to submit to the jurisdiction, is
not equivalent of a voluntary appear-
ance."
In Chalwon et. al. v. Hollenbach, 16 S.
& R. 424, it is held that a motion by an at-
torney to set aside a judgment by default
against a party, is not an appearance for
him.
In view of these facts we are of the
opinion that the appearance of the attor-
ney in the South Dakota court, to object
to the court's jurisdiction wasnota waiver •
of her right, and the court never had any
jurisdiction over her person. It would
follow, therefore, that the decree of divorce
-pronounced by the court in South Dakota
was void in Pennsylvania, that is, it was
a mere nullity in Pennsylvania as if it had
never been pronounced. This being so,
Smith's subsequent marriage in Pennsyl-
vania was void for the reason that his first
wife being still in full life. he did not have
capacity to contract a second marriage.
The second marriage therefore was illegal
and the said child, an illegitimate child.
Act April 8, 1833.
The only question yet remaining is, can
the first wife successfully claim the $300
widow's exemption and one-half of the
personalty, she having lived apart from
her husband for more than four years?
The Act of April 14, 1851, See. 5, P. L.
613, provides as follows: "The widow or
the children of any decedent dying withi n
this commonwealth may retain either real
or personal property belonging to said es-
tate to the value of $300, and the sante
shall not be sold, but suffered to remain
for the use of the widow and family."
Under this act it has been held that a wife
who did not form a partof his family and
homestead, could not successfully claim
the $300 exemption; Platt's Appeal 80 Pa.
504; Spear's Appeal, 26 Pa 234, and Het-
rick v. Hetrick, 55 Pa. 292.
In all these cases, however, the family re-
lation was broken up either by the default
of the wife, or with her consent. In Ferry's
Appeal, 55 Pa. 347, the distinction is clearly
drawn between the case of a wife who vol-
untarily relinquished the family relation
and one who is living separate and apart
from her husband through the default of
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the husband. In this case, Terry had de-
serted his wife and was absent from her
ten years before his death, he living in
Lanaster county, and she in Philadel-
phia with her mother and keeping the
two children, the issue of their marriage.
Upon being apprised of his death some
eight months thereafter, the wife by coun-
sel appeared before the auditor and claimed
the $300 provided under the Act of 1851.
The auditor allowed the claim, the Or-
phan's Court set it aside, and upon an ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, the Orphan's
Court was reversed. Mr. Justice Agnew,
in his opinion, saying, "In this case there
was no voluntary relinquishment of the
relation (family relation) on the part of
Mrs. Terry, and no provision for her;
while after her husband's desertion she
kept the children and maintained her
family relation along with them so far as
lay in her power."
There is no reason why this provision of
the law should not apply to her. In such
a case the family relation exists in the con-
templation of the law, although actual co-
habitation be suspended by the illegal act
of the husband. This doctrine is also
found in Coatis' Estate, 6 W. N. C. 367;
Sander's Estate, 12 Pa. 77, and in Scul-
lins' Estate, 5 C. C. 188. We see noth-
ing in the case before us to distinguish it
from the cases just cited, and therefore the
auditor is hereby reversed and the court
directs that Sarah Smith, the lawful wife
of Paul Smith, be paid the $100 as ex-
emption, and one-half of the personalty
absolutely.
YEAGLY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The divorce of Smith, by the South
Dakota court, was valid, it may be, in
South Dakota. The law of that state
makes a service on a non-resident who is
not within the state at the time of service
effectual to subject him to its jurisdiction.
In South Dakota, therefore, Sarah Jones
would not be at Smith's death, his widow.
The Constitution of the United States
requires full faith and credit to be given,
in any state, to the judicial proceedings
of any other state, and generally, that -in
the former, the same legal consequence
shall attach as in the latter. As the
divorce separates Smith and wife in South
Dakota, so it would seem to separate them
in Pennsylvania.
The principle of interstate comity is
bounded by the condition, (1) that the
court which pronounces judgment must
have jurisdiction of the person, and (2)
that it cannot acquire a jurisdiction of the
person, which the tribunals of other states
must recognize, by service of process.
beyond the state limits. Cooley Const.
Law, 205. It. would matter not whether
this extra-territorial service was accom-
plished by publication, or, as in this case,
by a personal service by a deputy sheriff
of South Dakota. The service on Mrs.
Smith was sufficient to give her notice
of the assumption by the South Dakota
court of jurisdiction in a case affecting her,
but could not oblige her to respect it, to
the extent of making a defence on pain of
suffering a judgment which would be
valid, not in South Dakota merely, but
in Pennsylvania. The cases cited by
the learned court below sufficiently prove
this. Scott v. Noble, 72 Pi. 115; Colvin v.
Reed, 55 Pa. 375.
Mrs. Smith, however, did respect the
service of process so far that she employed
an attorney to appear for her and to object
to the court's jurisdiction. Such an ap-
pearance, called in this state de bene esse,
is well known. It is not generally under-
stood to be the equivalent of a general ap-
pearance, nor does itjustify the arrogation
by the court of power to prosecute the in-
vestigation to a judgment on the merits
2 Epeyc. Plead and Pr. 620. Although it
would lead to confusion to allow a de-
fendant to appear for such purposes as he
chose, only, there is no apparent reason for
denying to him the rights to appear solely
to deny jurisdiction over his person, with-
out, by so doing, conferring thevery juris-
diction which he denies. The learned
court below correctly inferred that the
qualified appearance of Mrs. Smith ny at-
torney, did not bestow on the South
Dakota court the jurisdiction to decree a
divorce between her and her husband.
On the other points involved in the
case, discussion is unnecessaiy. Mrs.
Smith has done nothing to forfeit the
right to the widow's exemption. As there
are no legitimate children she is entitled
to one-half of the personalty. The
woman whom, after his divorce, Smith
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married, though his wife in South Dakota,
is not his wife in Pennsylvania. Nor is
her son entitled to a share in Smith's
estate.
Appeal dismissed.
TRITT vs. RAILWAY COMPANY.
Negligence-taster and servant-Inde-
pendent contractor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tritt in crossing the track in a wagon
was struck by a locomotive and hurt.
The Railroad Company sent its physician
to treat him. Tritt submitted to the
treatment which was unskillful, and re-
suited in a permanent injury to his leg,
whereas with proper treatment, Tritt
would in two.months have gotten well.
In his action for the negligence of the
company he sought damages for the pri-
mary injury, and also for the increased
injury, following from the unskillful treat-
ment.
Tritts' own physician agreed with the
mode of treatment proposed by the defend-
ant's physician at the interview immedi-
ately after the accident and then retired
from the case.
GERBER and MOREHOUSE for the plain-
tiff.
The master is liable for the torts of his
servant, committed while acting in the
course of his employment. Bardv. John,
26 Pa. 486; Guinney v. Hand, 153 Pa. 404;
Hays v. Miller, 77 Pa. 238.
BOUTON and PRICKET for the defendant.
The physician was an independent
worker, and not a servant of the company.
Tiffany, Domestic Relations, p. 508; Qf.
86 Pa. 153; 3 Gray (Mfass.) 349; 120 N. Y.
315.
OPINION OF THIE COURT
The material question upon which this
case hinges, is whether or not the de-
fendant company is liable for the acts and
negligence of the doctor.
The plaintiff was injured while cross-
ing railroad tracks of defendant company,
and the company sent. its own doctor to
attend him. The doctor was an employee
of the company, hud the relation of
master and servant existed. The plaintiff's
first remedy was an action against the
company, because the master is liable and
bound by acts of his servant, either in
respect to contract or injuries, when the
act is done by his authority. Here the
act was done by authority of the master.
This injury was done in the immediate
employment of the master, and resulted
from the negligence of the doctor, while
acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. In this case the master as well as
-the servant is responsible, this act was
done by order of the master, and done in
the prosecution of master business. It
does not have to be done in accordance
with the instruction of the master to
servant. Even though the servant deviates
from the instruction as to manner of doing
it; this does not relieve the master from
liability for the servant's acts. In this
case, the defendant tried to show that the
doctor was an independant contractor.
The statements of facts make it plain
enough that no such relation existed be-
cause there is a wide difference between a
servant and an independent contractor.
If a person contracted with another, who
is engaged in an independent employment
for the doing of certain work by the latter
but does not personally interfere or give
direction, respecting the manner of the
work, then the party employed is an inde-
pendent contractor, but in this case the
doctor was employed to do the company's
workin his line, and under the company's
order. He was in their employment at
the time of the accident, and was sent to
attend the plaintiff at the time of his
injury, by order of the company. Here
he was in company employment, sent by
the company, and the employment was of
such a character as to create the relation
of master and servant between them.
CANNON, J.
OPIN fON OF THE SUPREME COURT.
There is substantially no dispute that
Tritt was hurt by the negligence of the de-
fendant, and its liability for the result of
that injury is notseriously disputed. From
the injury thus received, he would have
got well in two months, had it been
treated with proper skill. It was not
treated with such skill. The prolongation
and aggravation of the injury are the re-
sult. Is the defendant liable for such ag-
gravat ion ?
Had Tritt himself called on the physi-
cian, whose want of skill is alleged, the
defendant would not for that reason be
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exempt from lidnility for the effects of
such want of skill co-operating with the
original injury. It would in addition be
necessary to show that Tritt employed a
physician whom, with proper care, he
would have known to be destitute of the
usual competence. Lyois v. Erie Rail-
way Co., 57 N. Y. 489 ; Eastman v. San-
born, 85 Mass. 594; Rice v. City of Des
Moines, 40 Iowa, 638; Loeser v. Humphrey.
41 Ohio, 378; Stoever v. Bluehill, 51 Me.
439; 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 391 ; 16 Am. &
E ng. Encyc. (1st edition) 441. It does not
appear that the reputation of the physician
who attended Tritt with respect to skill or
carefulness was bad, nor that he had any
reason to believe him to be otherwise than
competent.
But the physician who attended Tritt
was furnished by the defendant himself.
It would be idle therefore to say that, even
had Tritt had reason to know him incom-
petent, he would have precluded himself
from recovery from the defendant. The de-
fendant, surely, could not defend against
the claim for compensation, on tieground
that the physician whom it furnished,
acted unskillfully or negligently.
Had the defendant not been the cause
of the original hurt, we are quite prepared
to hold that it would not have been liable
for the mistake of the physician, if it had
exercised proper care in the selection of
him. It must be deemed, at most, an
agent of the plaintiff, in naking the selec-
tion. It is not the business of the railroad
company, to heal wounds, but to transport
passengers and goods. Though, should it
occasion an injury, it would be obliged,
either to furnish the physician himself, or
to furnish the money which the plaintiff
would need to spend in hiring one, and al-
though, having caused the injury, it fur-
nishes the physician, the physician is an
independentworker. He receives no orders
from the company. He consults his own
knowledge, or that of others whom lie
chooses to select. The company having
exercised care in designating him for the
task, is not responsible for his errors of
judgment, or imperfectness of knowledge.
or defects of attention. Pearl v. West End
Street Railway, 176 Mass. 177; Glavin v.
Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. 1. 411 ; Cf.
Edmundson v. IR. R. Co., 111 Pa. 316;
Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. 153 ; Smith v.
Simmons, 103 Pa. 32.
The learned court below took a different
view of the question, apparently without
much investigation or reflection holding
that the physician was servant to the
Company, and that for this reason, his
want of care and skill was imputable to it.
This we think an error. However, as it
allowed the jury to give compensation for
the entire injury, a proper verdict, upon
the evidence, seems to have been reached.
Judgment affirmed.
BALPH vs. R. R. CO.
Evidence-?es .qestac-AdmissibilitV of
declarations of a bg.stander a3 part of
-Spontaneous utterances and expres-
sions of inference distinguished-?epe-
tition of inadmissible statements
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Balph was run into at a crossing and
hurt by the defendant. At the trial
Althorp testified for him that no bell had
rung or whistle blown, and that the train
was coming at forty miles per hour. Five
minutes after the accident he had re-
marked to John Logan, that Balph would
not have been struck had he taken the
trouble to look and listen before venturing
on the track. This statement he repeated
four hours afterward in a letter to a
brother, who was an employee of the R.
R. Co. Defendant offered the oral state-
ment and the letter in evidence. The
court excluded them.
Verdict for plaintiff for $2,500. Motion
for a new trial.
WILLER for the plaintiff.
The declarations were admissible in
evidence as part of the res gestae. Call v.
Easton Traction Co., 180 Pa. 618; Tomp-
kins v. Saltmarsh, 14 S. & Rt. 272.
It is error to exclude an offer to show
that immediately after the occurrence,
the witness had made statements entirely
inconsistent with his testimony at the
trial. Com. v. Werntz, 161 Pa. 591. Cf.
Harriman v. Stone, 59 Mo. 93.
WILcox and JONES for the defendant.
The declarations were not a part of the
res gestae, but merely a passing remark
by a bystander, and not a spontaneous
utterance. McLeod v. Ginther, 80 Ky.
399; Lehay v. P. R. Co. 97 Mo. 165; Dustln
v. Radford, 58 Mich. 163; Ogden v. R. R.,
23 W. IT. 0. 191.
A declaration made two minutes after
the accident is not part of the resgestae.
Mindian R. Rt. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U.
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S. 99; Cf. P. R. R. v. Brooks, 57 Pa. 339;
R. R. Co. v. Coyle 55 Pa. 402.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is a motion for a new trial by the
defendant company. It seems that when
Althorp was on the stand and testified for
the plaintiff that no bell had been rung
or whistle blown, and the train was com-
ing at forty miles per hour, the defendant
did not ask the witness whether five min-
utes after the accident, he had remarked
to John Logan, and four hours after writ-
ten to his brother, that Balph would not
have been struck had lie taken the trouble
to look and listen before venturing on the
tracks. This might have established con-
tributory negligence on the part of plaiin-
tiff, and he would not have been able to
recover. Had he been questioned whether
or not he made this remark, and had de-
nied it, perhaps his oral statement and
letter would have been admissible to con-
tradict his prior testimony. But it does
not appear that the defendant questioned
the witness in this manner. It only ap-
pears that the defendant offered the oral
statement and letter to establish the fact
of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff. The court excluded the tes-
timony, and hence the motion for a new
trial.
We think the court was right in exclud-
ing this evidence. The learned counsel
for the defendant claims that the oral
statement which he made five minutes
after the accidentshould have been admit-
ted as a part of the re .qestae, and he cites
numerous authorities which will be noticed
hereafter in support of his contention.
We think those cases can be distin-
guished from the one now under consider-
ation. We must first understand the
principle of the res gestae, and the reason
forits exception to the "hearsay rule."
Taylor says, "In all these cases the
principal points of attention are whether
the circumstances and declaration offered
in proof were so connected with the main
fact under consideration as to illustrate its
character, or to further its objects." Tay-
lor on Ev. 588. The reason for its excep-
tion is: "That a person's mind is in a
state of excitement on account of some
event which happened to, or was seen by
him, or when a person's mind is occupied
with some transaction, and under such a
state of mind he makes a statement, the
law presumes he told the truth, for he had
no time to think of an untruth. But how,
when and where shall he be connected
with the event or transaction, that his
declaration may be admissible? There
could no test be given for that. Their ad-
missibility must be determined by the'
judge according to the degree of their re-
lations to the facts.
The law is well settled by text writers
and by decisions, that before a statement
can be admitted as a partof the res gestae,
it must appear that the statement was
made contemporaneously with the main
fact, or at least, the two shall be so clearly
connected, that the declaration can, in an
ordinary course of affairs, be said to be the
spontaneous exclamation of the real cause.
Leather v. Gas Co., 97 Mo. 165; Waldele
v. N. Y. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 274; Luby v.
Hudson R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 131 ; Rockell
v. Taylor, 41 Conn. 55.
It is true that the exception of the res
gestae to the hear say rule applies to by-
standers as to those who are concerned
with the main fact. But a sound discre-
tion should be exercised by the judge in
connecting the bystander to the trans-
action, that his statement may be said to
be made spontaneously. Suppose A and
B were in a train wreck, A was injured
and B not. 0 was merely an outside by-
stander. There would be no doubt that
the excitement and the influence of the
mind by the accident will last longer with
A than with B, and with B than with C,
and that B, who was the bystander in the
train, is more copnected with the main
fact than C, who was merely an outside
bystander, and that the state of mind will
change sooner by C than by B.
Now, let us consider the case at bar.
Althorp was merely an outside bystander;
he was neither connected with the train,
nor with the accident. He made his re-
marks five minutes after the accident had
happened. It does not even appear that
he made his remarks at the place where
Balph was struck down, and that the in-
jured party was in his presence. The act
has been done and completed five min-
utes before his statement. We therefore
cannot hold his statement.as a part of the
res gestae, but purely as an opinion of a
past occurrence.
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In the case of the Vicksburg & Meridian
R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, (119 U. S. 99) the
question of admissibility of the evidence
of declaration by the engineer of a train,
which met with an accident, made from
ten or thirty minutes of the accident, re-
sulted in a judgment against admitting
the evidence, although fiur of the judges
were in favor of admitting. But their
reason was, as TMr. Justice Field in his dis-
senting opinion says: "As the declara-
tion was made between ten and thirty
minutes after the accident, we may well
conclude that it was made in the sight of
a wrecked train, and in presence of the in-
jured parties, and whilst surrounded by
excited passengers. An accident happen-
ing to a raiwvay train by which a car is
wrecked, would naturally lead to a great
deal of excitement among the passengers
in the train, and the character and cause
of the accident would be the subject of ex-
planation for a considerable time after-
wards by passengers connected with the
train. We may add that the engineer
being under such a great responsibility
would surely be under still more excite-
ment than the passengers. It is difficult
to perceive how anything given in Mr.
Justice Field's opinion can have any ma-
terial bearing upon the case at bar. As we
have stated already, Althorp was not con-
nected with the train. It does not even
appear that he made his statement in the
presence of the train and injured party.
He made his statement five minutes after
the accident and four hours later he re-
peated the same in a letter to his brother,
an employee of the R. R. Co., which letter
corroborated his prior statement, and who
can tell what his motive was in making
the statementand writing the letter? The
letter and statement are mere hearsay,
and they cannot be admitted. The case
of Hanover R. R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. 396,
and the case of Coll v. Easton Transit Co.,
180 Pa. 618, can be distinguished on the
same ground from the case atbar. We will
cite to support our view, Ogden v. R. R.
Co., 23 W. N. C. 191; Lane v. Bryant, 9
Gray 245 ; Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall. 637;
Insurance Co. v. Mosby, 8 Wall. 397.
In view of all those eases cited the
motion for a new trial is dismissed.
KAUFMAN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The learned court below excluded evi-
dence that five minntes'after the accident,
Althorp had remarked to Logan that
Bnlpli wouhl not have been struck had he
taken the trouble to look and listen before
venturing on the track. Althorp was not
agent for Balph, nor in any way so con-
nected with him as to justify the imputa-
tion of his remark to Balph. Had Balph
made it, it would have weighed heavily
against him. But Althorp would in no
way represent him in making the admis-
sion. As such, therefore, the remark was
inadmi-sible.
Was the remark a part of the res gestae?
The res was the collision of the train with
Balph. The act of Althorp was not a part
of the collision, neither cause, nor concom-
itant. The sensations of bystanders, their
seeing and hearing, the emotions which
stirred in them as the result of the acci-
dent, were not a part of it. Still less were
their exclamations, or their deliberate nar-
ratives, concerning it. Part of the resgestae
then, Althorp's remark could not be, nor
was.
But, was it a statement so near to the
occurrence, so sp0intaneous, as to be re-
ceivable, because of its probable corre-
spondence with Althorp's perception of
the fact? It was not an exclamation. It
was bot synchronous with the collision.
Nothing shows that it was the result of
an excited impulse. It does not appear,
as the learned court below points out, that
the remark was made at the site of the ac-
cident. The interval of five minutes
would be unimportant, if the circum-
stances showed that the reflective and
critical attitude of mind had not been re-
gained by the witness. But there are no
such circumstances.
The remark is not of a fact. It expresses
not an observation, but an opinion ; not
what did happen, but what would not
have happened had certain things not
happened. Althorp tells Logan that Bsilph
would not have been struck (but he was
struck) if he had taken the trouble to look
and listen. But, is this an assertion that
Balph did not look and listen ? Or is it
merely the expression of an inference that
Balph did not look and listen, from the
fact that he was struck? So far as ap-
pears, it may have been the latter. In-
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stead of a spontaneous utterance of a fact,
it may have been the expression of a
philosophizing mood.
The remark was not admissible as con-
tradicting the present testimony of the
witness. There was no inconsistency be-
tween the statement that the bell had
not rung, nor the whistle blown, and that
the train was going at the rate of 40 miles
per hour, and the statement that Balph
did not stop, look and listen, or that had
he done so, he would not have been hurt.
That the statement was inserted in a
letter writte-i four hours later, to the wit-
ness' brother, qualified neither the oral
statement nor the letter, to be received in
evidence. An inadmissible statement does
not grow to be admissible by repetition.
Judgment affirmed.
WOODFILL BROS. vs. MARTHA
THOMPSON.
Mfarried women-Rights-Separate prop-
erty not liable for debts of husband-
Acts of April 11, 1848; April 22, 1850;
April 1, 1863.
STATEMEANT OF THE CASE.
Some time in the year 1890, Martha
Livingston, of the Borough of West
Brownsville, purchased a lot of ground in
the said borough worth about $1,200.00,
paying for it with her own funds. In 1894,
the said Martha Livingston married R. J.
Thompson; soon after their marriage R.
J. Thompson obtained a small grocery
store in West Brownsville, and ran it uun-
der the name of R. J. Thompson. The
said R. J. Thompson was killed on the
railroad some time in the year 1896. His
wife, Martha Thompson, continued run-
ning the grocery, having goods shipped to
her, and leaving the sign in front of her
store as R. J. Thompson. This busine-s
of Mrs. Thompson did not prove profit-
able, she becoming indebted to various
firms for various amounts. She confessed
judgment in the name of Martha Thomp-
son to Woodfill Bros., on April 17th, 1899,
entered to No. 192 May Term, 1899, for
$266. On April 1, 1900, she obtained a
loan on the said property for $500, giving
a mortgage for that amount, which mort-
gage was duly recorded. The mortgagee
being Bernice Lily. The agent of Bernice
Lily made a thorough examination of the
records and found no liens against the
property in the name of Martha Thomp-
son, except the Woodfill Bros. judgment
above referred to. Woodfill Bros. issued
an execution on theirjudgment and levied
on and sold the lot of ground in West
Brownsville, purchased by Martha Liv-
ingston, now Martha Thompson. The day
of the sheriff's sale, Bernice Lily was in-
formed that there were other judgments
that were liens upon the property of
Martha Thompson, other than the one
held by the Woodfill Bros., and that these
judgments, all of which were entered prior
to the date of the mortgage, were obtained
against R. J. Thompson, on November
28, 1898, and entered on JAnuary 4, 1899,
and that the holders of these judgments
would claim the right to the proceeds of
the sheriff's sale. These judgments ag-
gregate the sum of $325. The property
was sold to Lewis S. Jackman for the sum
of $825, and there being a dispute as to the
application of this $82.5, Bernice Lily has
petitioned the court to appoint an auditor
to make distribution. The creditors of R.
J. Thompson claim to be first paid.
DAvis and RHODES, J., for the plain-
tiff.
A judgment against a deceased person
is nota nullity. Carry. Townsend'sEx.'s,
63 Pa. 203; Wooden v. Tainter, 4 Watts
270.
As admr. d. s. t., she is liable for all her
husband's debts to the value of the prop-
erty at the time of so acting. Luffbarry's
Estate, 12Phila. 7; Wood's Estate, 1 Ash.
314.
HousE R and THORNE for the defendant.
A judgment obtained against the hus-
band of a married woman before or during
marriage, shall not bind or be a lien upon
her real estate. Act of April 11, 1848 ; April
22, 1850 ; April 1,1863 ; Woodward v. Wil-
son, 68 Pa. 208.
Separate property of a married woman
is sold under a judgment obtained against
tier, the proceeds must be distributed
among her lien creditors in the order of
their priority. Findley's Appeal, 67 Pa.
453 ; Lewis v. Bunster, 57 Pa. 410.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
An investigation of the provisions of tihe
several acts of assembly governing the
property rights of married women leaves
little else to be said in the case at bar. By
S18, Act of April 11, 1848, it is provided,
inter alia, "* * * * the said property,
whether owned by herbefore marriage, or
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which shall accrue to her afterwards, shall
not be subject to levy and execution for
the debts or liabilities of her husband."
Cf. Act of April 22, 1850. Again, by the
Act of April 1, 1863, it is provided "No
judgment obtained against the husband of
any married woman, before or during mar-
riage, shall bind, or be a lien upon her real
estate." The property sold and from
which the fund in dispute was raised was
the individual property of Martha Thomp-
son. It was her separate estate. Her hus-
band never possessed rights in it save the
prospective right of curtesy. The debts
contracted by him were in his own name,
his wife at no time having made herself or
her property liable therefore. This is evi-
dent from the fact that in 1898, action for
the recovery of judgments, which claim
precedence here, were brought severally
against the estate of R. J. Thompson.
When Thompson died, his wife's estate
was unencumbered. Whatever charges
are against her property are the results of
her own subsequent acts. No element of
fraud, or fraudulent holding out, on her
part, is disclosed. She continued the busi-
ness. Goods were shipped to her and on
her responsibility. No one was injured
by her allowing the sign of R. J. Thomp-
son to remain in front of the store. She
ordered goods in her name; they were
shipped in her name, on her responsibil-
ity. She became indebted to several par-
ties, doubtless the persons from whom
she purchased goods. Among these cred-
itors was the firm of Woodfill Bros., in
whose favor she confessed judgment for
$266, and this was placed on record. Other
breditors remained and to meet these obli-
gations $600 was borrowed, and a mort-
gage given therefor. Execution issues on
the judgment, Martha Thompson's prop-
erty is sold, and out of the $8'25 realized
the individual creditors of R. J. Thomr1p-
son claim to be first paid. That they have
no standing to assert such claim is evident
from the acts previously referred to. More-
over, it has been judicially passed upon in
a long line of cases. As wassaid by Agnew,
J., in Findley's Appeal, 67 Pa. 453, "In
order to maintain the right of a claim,
filed against the husband alone, to be paid
out of the fund, we must hold that .the
sale under such a claim would pass the
title of the wife which bhe holds in her
own right. But this is contrary to all our
notions of ajudicial sale. There is no rela-
tion of trustee and cestui que trust, or of
any other privity of estate, which can pos-
sibly make a sale in the name of one carry
the estate of the other. Not only is the
estate of the wife her own separate and
independent interest, but it is protected
by express statute from the acts, encum-
brance and executions of the husband."
Beside this, both the judgment creditor
oflvlrs. Thompson as well as the mortgagee
have placed their dependence on the
record, and will be protected. Purchasers,
investors, etc., are not obliged to take no-
tice of matters extraneous to the public
record, but which record only they are
bound to notice at their peril. "Such an
anomaly that the divestiture of her title
shall depend not on the record * * but
on extraneous proof * * "could not be
tolerated. What notice would the claim
against her husband be to subsequent lien
creditors or purchasers from her? It
would not stand against her title on the
judgment index, or upon any record."
Findley's Appeal, 67 Pa. 453; Lloyd v.
Hibbs, 81 Pa. 306 ; Shannon v. Shultz, 87
Pa 481; Kuhns v. Turney, 87 Pa. 497;
Appeal of Germania Savings Bank, 95
Pa. 32d. "A judgment against him can
be levied only of his own estate 6r title.
* * * The purpose of the Act of 1850,
and still more of the Act of 1863, was to
prevent the wife from being deprived of
the benefit of her estate, through the de-
rivative interest of her husband." Wood-
ward v. Wilson, 68 Pa. 208; Milligan v.
Phipps, 153 Pa. 208. The learned auditor
has correctly held that since the levy was
made upon property recorded in her name
and the purchaser acquired her title, the
fund for distribution is the proceeds of the
sale of the wife's interest and should go in
payment of her lien creditors, according
to their priority.
ELMIES, J.
HAMLIN vs. CRARY.
Injunction-Building restriction-Condi-
tion in a deed-By whom it can be en-
forced.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Tromplin, owning two adjacent
lots, conveyed one of them (B) to Crary
by a deed which contained the words,
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"This conveyance is on the condition
that there shall never be erected on the
said lot a building nearer than twenty-
five feet from the front of the building
line." On the lot (A), retained by Tromp-
lin, was a house in which he resided and
from windows in the side of which he
had a view diagonally across the lot (B)
to the street. One of the purposes of the
condition was to perpetuate the enjoy-
nient of the view. Five years after the
conveyance Tromplin died, and at Or-
phan's court sale for the payment of
debts, the lot (A) was sold to Hamlin,
one of the three nephews, who were the
next of kin and heirs. The price paid
was $2,700, all of which was consumed in
paying the debts. Two years after the sale
Crary began to erect a building on the
building line of his lot. This was a bill
for an injunction.
MAYS and KNAPPENBERGER for plain-
tiff.
The restriction was imposed for the
benefit of the property now held by coam-
plainant. Clark v. ,Martin, 49 Pa. 297.
The building restriction was in the na-
ture of a covenant running with the land
and created an easement in favor of the
adjoining lot. Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer.
163 Pa. 643.
This was not merely a personal right in
the original owner, but was an easement
appurtenant to the estate which plaintiff
purchased. Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass.
546. Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591.
HICKERNELL and PEIGHTEL for de-
fendant.
The controlling element in such cases is
the intention of the parties to the covenant.
Hutchinson v. Thomas, 190 Pa. 242; Lan-
dell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327.
This is not a condition which the heirs
of the grantor can enforce, but merely a
personal covenant with the grantor. Skin-
ner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180; Clapp v.
Wilder, 50 L. R. A. 121.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
We think this case turns upon the legal
effect of the phrase contained in the deed
from Tromplin to Crary. "This convey-
ance is on the condition that there.shall
never be erected on said lot a building
nearer than 25 ft. from the front building
line on the lot." Whether this is a comi-
mon law condition or a covenant running
with the land, it is unnecessary for us to
determine in this kind of an action, be-
cause the action is in a court of equity. It
would be otherwise if the action was
brought in a common law court. The case
.of Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 297, holds" If it
were a proceeding in the common law
form, it would be necessary to inquire in-
to the form in which the right is reserved,
but in equity form of proceeding we in-
quire only into its substantial elements.,
The first question which confronts usis
whether this restriction was imposed for
the benefit of the laud now held by the
plaintiff, or whether it was imposed for
the mere personal benefit of the grailtor.
This question can only be solved by as-
certaining the intention of the parties,
when the land was conveyed, in the light
of surrounding circumstances, or as Mr.
Justice Dean puts it in Landell v. Hamil-
ton, 175 Pa. 327: "In equity the test by
which to determine whether a covenant
in a deed runs with the land, is the inten-
tion of the parties; to ascertain such in-
tention, resort must be had to the words
of the covenant in the light of the sur-
roundings of the parties and the subject
of the grant."
There is no language in the deed from
Tromplin to Crary, expressly stating that
this restriction was inserted to create a
servitude or right which should inure to
the benefit of the plaintift's land. And
we think this is rendered all the more
certain and significant when we take into
consideration the fact that the grantee's
heirs and assigns are not included in the
restrictive clause, which words, we think
it is extremely probable, he would have in-
serted if he had intended it to benefit his
land "forever" and not merely himself
for life.
This is not the case where the owner of
land adopts a scheme or plan for its im-
provement, as is illustrated by the cases of
Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643, Lan-
dell v. Hamilton, 175Pa. 327 and 17Stper.
C. 2.35. Because in those cases there is an
express language to the effect in the deeds,
showing an intention to create a benefit
appurtenant to the land.
The only circumstance which may be
relied upon as showing that the grantor
intended to create a benefit remaining
with the land, is the fact that he was oc-
cupying it as a homestead at the time of
the grant, and that it would be a benefit to
the land to have the restriction observed
after his death. But the facts of the case
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are just as consistent with the idea that
the grantor intended that the land should
have the benefit of the restriction as long
as the grantor lived. For after his death,
he having received all the benefit he could
receive from the restriction, it would be
immaterial to him whether the restriction
was observed or not observed. This doc-
trine is sustained by the cases of Skinner
v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180, and Clapp v.
Wilder, 50 L. R. A. 121, a recent Massa-
chusetts case, decided in June, 1900. We
are prone to admit that .the doctrine of
Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289, is seemingly
in conflict when comparing the cases su-
perficially, but upon full examination we
think that the confliction Is more appar-
ent than real.
There is no merit in the argument that
the plaintiff received his title through aii
Orphan's Court sale, for the purchaser
takes only such title as the decedent had
at his death. Bashore v. Whistler, 3
Watts 494. Kennedy's Appeal, 4 Pa. 149.
We think the plaintiff's case falls flatly
when considered in the true light of at-
tendant circumstances. Bill dismissed.
GRoss, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The clause quoted from Tromplin's deed
to Crary, expresses a condition. But, it
is not as a condition that Hamlin is seek-
ing to enforce it. As a condition it can be
enforced only by an entry or by ejectment.
This bill is neither. Nor could any other
than Tromplin or his heir avail himself of
it. Hamlin is not Tromplin's heir.
But, the same act oromission, by which
the grant is conditioned, may also be
agreed or covenanted for, and, when such
agreement or covenant is descried in the
words, the remedies proper to it may be
employed. Electric City Land etc. Co.
v. Coal Co., 187 Pa. 500. When the in-
tention is discovered, to impose a re-
striction on the use of one tract, for the
advantage of another, despite mutations
of ownership, a servitude will be held to be
created, and a court of equity will compel
the owner of the servient land to respect
it. Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289; St. An-
drews Churchs' Appeal, 67 Pa. 512; Lan-
dell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327; Muzzarelli
v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643.
We do not understand that this principle
was seriously contested in the court below.
What was contested was the intention of
Tromplin to impose on the owner of the
Crary lot a restriction for a longer period.
than that of the continued ownership by
Tromplin, of the adjacent lot. Tromplin
continued to own this lot for five.years,
but, then dying, his estate in it was sold,
under the order of the Orphan's Court, to
Hantlin, one of his heirs, and Hamlin now
alleges that the restriction was intended
not for the benefit of Tromplin, so long
as he continued to own the lot, but for the
benefit of the lot, in whosesoever owner-
ship.
The language of the deed is "that there
shall never be erected" etc., and it rather
clearly points out that the erection for-
bidden was forbidden not for a term of
years, or for the life of the grantor, but in
perpetuity.
To qualify this signification, reference is
made to the fact that Tromplin resided in
the house on the lot retained by him, that
in the side of this house were windows
looking across the lot sold from which a
view of the street could be had, and that
one of his purposes was to "perpetuate
the enjoyment of this view." From these
facts the learned court below has con-
cluded that the restriction was intended
to last only during Tromplin's ownership,
and has therefore dismissed the bill.
It is indeed difficult to imagine any
other object of the restriction than to
preserve the access of view, light and air
to Tromplin's house, through the lateral
windows, and should he or his successors
in the ownership ever close up those win-
dows, permanently, it is very likely that
the courts finding no purpose useful to
the dominant premises, any longer sub-
served, would hold that the restriction had
become extinct. f Landell v. Hamilton,
175 Pa. 327, 337. What we are concerned
to learn is, some intimation that the ob-
ject was to preserve the view, for only a
brief period of time. We fail to find any.
The circumstance that Tromplin was per-
sonally occupying the dominant house is
not such. If he appreciated the light, air
and view, he must have known that his
successors in the occupancy, would do the
same. By perpetuating the right to such
view, he would maintain a greater mar-
ket value for the house. "To perpetuate
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the enjoyment of this view" is not equiva-
lent to perpetuating "hisenjoymentof this
view." Besides, "one of the purposes" of
the condition was this. There were there-
fore others, and among them, may have
been the enhancement of the selling value
of the dominant premises, by securing for
all purchasers, a right to an unobstructed
view. The "condition" is thatthere shall
"never" be erected a building within a
given space, and we are not able to dis-
cover, in the facts found, adequate reason
for changing the word "never," to "never
during Tromplin's ownership." Had
Crary understood the word "never" in
this sense, how natural it would have
been for him to have insisted that the
words needful to remove doubt be in-
serted.
We have examined Clapp v. Wilder,
176 Mass. 332, which is in most respects
similar to the case before us. Though
the majority of the court dismissed the
bill, three respectable members dissented,
and we are convinced that the dissenters
had the better reason. In the case before
us, the facts adverted to by Hammond, J.
on page 339, do not appear.
The conclusion we have reached is that
a fair interpretation of the language of
the deed and of the facts, is that a perpet-
ual right to light, air and view, was re-
served by the condition to the dominant
lot, and that this right should be protected
from violation by injunction. Clark v.
Martin, 49 Pa. 297.
Decree reversed.
COOK vs. BOYLSTON.
Negligence- Proximate cause-Contribu-
tory negligence-Prorince of the court
and jury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Cook and Boylston owned adjoining
tracts. On his, Boylston carried on a busi-
ness which required the use of fire. By
some negligence of his servants, the fire
caught a pile of lumber, which after sone
difficulty was suppressed. The fire, how-
ever, only smouldered, and after three
hours was renewed by a vigorous breeze,
started up into fury, involving the whole
pile of lumber, and at length set fire to the
buildings on Cook's tract. The fire could
have been prevented had Cook, who saw
its beginning, communicated his fear that
it was not extinct, to Boylston, and wished
that more thorough means be employed
to put it out. He did not do this because
he was not on speaking terms with
Boylston. The damage suffered was $560.
SCHNEE and ALBERTSON for plaintiff.
It is for the jury to decide whether de-
fendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's damage. Haverly v. R.
R. Co., 135 Pa. 50; Born v. Allegheny
Plank Road Co., 101 Pa. 336.
If the plaintiff has made out his case
without showing contributory negligence
on his part it is incumbent on defendant
to prove it. Contributory negligence is not
presumed. King v. Thompson, 87 Pa. 365;
Bom v. Plank Road Co., Supra.; R. R.
v. Hassard, 75 Pa. 367.
Whether theconductofplaintiffamount-
ed to contributory negligence is a question
for the jury. 87 Pa. 365;76 Pa. 168; 66 Pa.
30; 101 Pa. 336.
SHERBINE and CHAPMAN for defend-
ant.
The facts being undisputed and the in-
ference to be drawn from them being free
from doubt, it is a question for the court,
81 Pa. 274; 119 Pa. 53; 160 Pa. 365; 172 Pa.
646; 104 Pa. 306.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an action for damages caused by
the destruction of the building of the
plaintiff, John Cook, in the following
manner: Defendant and plaintiff respec-
tively owned adjoining tracts of land. The
defendant was making a lawful use of fire
on his premises when by some negligence
on his part the fire caught a pile of lumber
near by. It was, however, gotten under
control and finally, as the defendant sup-
posed, extinguished. The fire, however,
only slumbered, and in the course of three
hours was revived by a vigorous breeze,
burned the lumber and finally the build-
ing of the plaintiff. It seems that the
damage could have been prevented had
the plaintiff, who feared the fire had
not been extinguished, made known his
fears to the defendant and insisted that
more thorough means be used to put it
out: this he did not do. On these facts a
motion has been made to enter a nonsuit.
After a careful examination of the Penn-
sylvania authorities we are unwilling to
take the questions here presented away
from the jury.
Two questions arise, first: Was the
negligence of the defendant the proximate
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or remote cause of the burning of the
plaintiff's building? If the remote cause
there can be no recovery. Second: Was
the plaintiff guilty of contributory negli-
gence? If so, he cannot recover. LeRoy
Haverly v. State Line R. R. Co. 135 Pa.
50. The proximate cause is the immediate
cause. If a new force or power has inter-
vened of itself sufficient to stand as the
cause of the misfortune the other must be
considered as too remote. Who is to de-
cide whether an act is the proximate or
the remote cause? LeRoy Haverly v.
State Line R. R. Co. states the rule as it
is applied, in our opinion, in Pennsylvania.
and also the case of the Penna. R. R. Co.
v. Hoag, 80 Pa. 873. In the latter case
the Chief Justice says: The jury must de-
termine whether the facts constitute a
continuous succession of events so linked
together that they become a natural whole
or whether the chain of events is so broken
that they become independent, and the
final result cannot be said to be the nat-
ural and probable consequence of the pri-
mary cause, the negligence of the defend-
ant.
As to the second question raised: Con-
tributory negligence is a want of ordinary
care upon the part of a person injured by
the actionable negligence of another, com-
bining and concurring with that negli-
gence and contributing to the injury as a
proximate cause thereof, without which
the injury would not have occurred. Who
is to say whether there has been a want of
ordinary care? The question is generally
for the jury. It is only when there is no
reasonable doubt as to the facts, or as to
the just inferences to be drawn therefrom,
that the question may properly be passed
upon by the court. McKee v. Bidwell, 74
Pa. 218. Baker V. Felio, 97 Pa. 70. In
135 Pa. 50, heretofore cited, it was said:
When a person knows of the existence of
a fire upon the property of another, which
is likely to spread and destroy his own
property, he is bound to use reasonable
care and diligence to prevent its spreading,
whether he has done so when, after at-
tempting to extinguish it he has gone away,
mistakenly supposing that it was out, is a
question to be determined by the jury. So
in this case, whether the plaintiff acted as
an ordinarily prudent man would act wio
knew cf the fire, and feared that it had
not been extinguished, is to be determined
by the jury.
Motion to enter a nonsuit is overruled.
RHODES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Boylston was within his right, in con-
ducting a business on his premises tbatre-
quired the use of fire. But the existence
of the fire put on him a. duty carefully to
guard it so that it might not communicate
to the buildings of Cook. It might thus
communicate, by seizing inflammable ma-
terial in large quantity, such as a lumber
pile, on his own premises, and thence
leaping to the structures upon the adja-
cent land. There might then, as regards
Cook, be negligence in allowing the lum-
ber pile to catch fire. If combustible stuff
was scattered at such intervals between
the original locality of the fire, and Cook's
buildings, as to make the spread of it to the
buildings probable, in case of failure to
watch and repress, negligence in watch-
ing would visit on Boylston the conse-
quences.
Boylston's agents negligently allowed
the fire to catch the lumber pile. Their
want of care is, it is needless to say, im-
putable to him. Cooley, Torts, 700. It
now became their and his duty to extin-
guish the combustion of the lumber. They
made an attempt to do so. They "sup-
pressed" the fire, but did not put it out. Tt
smouldered, and after three hours, was re-
kindled by a breeze. Had the fire in the
lumber been put out, of course a fresh act
of negligent creation of an unintended fire
would have been necessary, to visit re-
sponsibility on Boylston. The nexus be-
tween the initial negligence and the burn-
ing of Cook's buildings would have been
broken. But, there was no such breach.
The revived fire was a continuation of the
first fire in the lumber, and that was the
result of the negligent supervision of the
fire employed in Boylston's business.
It is true that Boylston's servants sup-
pressed the fire. They may have thought
that they had put it out. But they had
not. Even had there been no negligence
in allowing the fire to reach the lumber,
there may have been negligence in not
wholly extinguishingitin the lumber, and
whether there was, would be a question
for the jury. The fire was in fact not put
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out. The revived fire was a later phase of
the same continuous act of combustion.
But, it is objected, the rise of a breeze was
the occasion of the revival and exacerba-
tion of the fire. So it was. But a man is
notexcused fromliability for consequences,
because they were produced, not by his
own act alone, but by the co-operation
therewith, of other forces. No conse-
quences are produced by human acts
alone. Causation is not simple but multi-
ple. Every event issues from a mass of
causes and conditions. The fact that the
wind arose three hours after the cessation
of the effort to put out the fire, does not
make the wind the cause of the revived
fire; and cut the casual tie between the
smouldering combustion and that new
fire. Without the wind, no new fire, but,
also, without the obscure combustion, no
new fire.
The real question is, not whether there
is a casual connection between the initial
or any intermediate negligence and the
injury to Cook's buildings, but whether
the intervening of the wind, as a co-oper-
ating cause, was fairly expectable, and, if
so, whether the effect of re-kindling the
fire was also fairly expectable. We think,
in the absence of evidence of an extraordi-
nary character of the breeze, that it was
not error to allow the jury to say whether
it was so little unlikely, that Boylston
should have had reference to it, and made
provision against its effect, in case it
should come. Cf. Haverly v. R. R. Co.,
135 Pa. 50; Yoders v. Amwell Township,
172 Pa. 447.
Cook, having witnessed the fire in the
lumber, feared that the efforts to put it out
had not succeeded, but refrained from ad-
monishing Boylston to employmore thor-
ough means, because he was not on speak-
ing terms with Boylston. The knowledge
of the fire in the lumber pile imposed on
Cook a duty of vigilantprecaution against
its spreading. Haverly v. R. R. Co., 135
Pa. 50, and if he omitted this duty, and
the omission contributed to the injury
subsequently suffered by him, he could
not recover. We think the learned court
properly left to the jury, the decision
whether Cook had been guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. The fire could have been
prevented had Cook spoken his fear to
Boylston. But, wouldit have been? And
did Cook know, or should he have known,
that his speaking to Boylston would have
prevented the fire? If his speaking would
not have induced Boylston to increase his
diligence, the failure to speak was not a
cause of the omission thus to increase his
diligence. And, even if it would, in order
to convict Cook of negligence, it must ap-
pear that to him there appeared a reason-
able probability that his speaking to Boyl-
ston would be followed by action. The
court could not have assumed that the
omishion of Cook to speak was a cause of
the subsequent conflagration.
Judgment affirmed.
AMES vs. COLLINS.
Bights of Riparian owners-stoppel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Collins owned a track of land on which
was a spring of water. The water came
from higher sources in the west. To the
east of Collins' tract was that of Ames.
There was a descent of Collins' land from
a line west of the spring to Ames and the
water from the spring flowed in a narrow
channel to and over Ames' land. Collins
used the water for cooking, drinking and
washing, but he sold to a neighbor the
right to conduct away a portion of it in a
pipe.
Ames had been using the water to irri-
gate a meadow of twelve acres, having cut
little channels for it over the meadow.
Had Collins used it in a similar manner
no water would have reached Ames' tract.
Had Ames not used it as he did, nor Col-
lins as he did, the stream would have
reached the farm lying to the east of Ames.
It had never reached there owing to the
uses to which Ames and Collins had put in.
In a previous action by Mrs. Ames, wife
of William, she had claimed as owner, and
William had testified that she was the
owner. He now shows that her father
had executed a deed for the land to him,
and deposited it with a mutual friend
until the grabtor's death, and that this
friend had not delivered the deed to him
or informed him of it at the time of the
trial of the former action, and that he had
supposed his wife was the owner as heir of
her father.
Trespass for damages.
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BENJAmIN and KAUFBIAN for the plain-
tiff.
The upper riparian owner is liable tothe
owner of the land below him for every ma-
terial diminution of the flow of the water
by a diversion of the stream whether for
irrigation or other purposes. Question
does not turn on whether occupant below
has sufflcient water left for his domestic
purposes, but whether the quantity flow-
ing on his land has been materially les-
selied or diminished. 9 Pa. 74; 25 Pa. 528;
24 Pa. 298.
The sizeof the stream is immaterial if it
has a well defined channel and a regular
flow in that channel, it cannot be diverted
to the injury of the riparian proprietor be-
low. 12 Wend, 330.
Evidence tending to show injury to par-
ties east of Ames is inadmissible, as it
does not prove a fact having legal oper-
ation on the rights of parties to this suit.
10 Watts 128.
Ames is not estopped from bringing this
suit by his testimony in the previous
action by Mrs. Ames. When a pirty has
acted in ignorance of his title, to his preju-
dice, he will be relieved in equity. Whe-
fan's Appeal, 70 Pa. 410.
MILLER and FLEITZ for the defendant.
There being nothing to show the spring
is fed by a defined stream, it must be pre-
sumed to be formed by perculating water
and as such it belongs wholly to the owner
of the soil. Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 803.
Collins had a right to sell the water as
the spring was upon his own land, and the
damage to Ames is damnum absque in-
juria. Penn. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113
Pa. 1.36.
Ames is estopped from setting up his
title, by his testimony at the former trial.
Lord v. Water Co., 135 Pa. 122.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This deed conveyed title to Ames and
he has the right to bring this action.
Where a deed, duly executed, is delivered
by a grantor to a third person to be kept
by him until after the death of the grantor
and then to be delivered to the grantee,
such delivery after the grantor's death,
passes title to the grantee. Where the
future delivery of a deed is merely to
await the lapse of time or the happening
of some contingency and not the per-
formance of any condition it will he
deemed the grantor's dedd presently.
Stephens v. Reenhart, 72 Pa. 434.
Neither is he estopped from bringing
this action on account of his testimony in
the former action, for in estoppel the
element of fraud is essential. Hill v. Epley,
31 Pa. 331.
Another of the weightiest elements of
estoppel, knowledge of his own rights in
the subject matter, is absent, and there is
no other ground on which defendant could
base any equity againstplaintiff. Hays v.
Hays, 179 Pa. 277.
There can be no such thing as owner-
ship in flowing water; the riparian owner
may use it as it flows, he may dil it up
and become the owner by emptying it in
barrels or tanks, but so long as it flows it
is as free to all as the light and air. Haup's
Appeal, 125 Pa. 211. To entitle a stream
to the consideration of tile law, it is
certainly necessary that it be a wyater
course, in the proper sense of the term.
A spring gutter on the surface is nover-
theless a water course although it is not
equal in volume to a river. Small as it
may be, if it has a clear and well defined
channel, it cannot be diverted to the
injury of the proprietor's below. Wheatley
v. Bough. 25 Pa. 528.
The flowing of this stream for a long
time through the land of the plaintiff
gives him as owner of the property the
right to a continuods use of the stream for
the customary purposes of agriculture and
if the upper riparian owner or any person
claiming under him divert the stream
from its natural channel, leading it off
from the land and appropriating it for
other purposes than those of agriculture
for which it has been theretofore used, the
person so diverting it, subjects himself to
an action for damages such as the per-
son injured may have sustained. Lord
v. Meadville Water Co, 135 Pa. 122.
A proprietor of land over which a stream
of water runs, has as, against a lower pro-
prietor, the use of only so much of the
stream as will not materially diminish
its quality. His right is not to be meas-
ured by the reasonable dividends of his
business. Wheatly v. Crismer, 24 Pa. 298.
A man may use the water of a stream
for the purpose of watering his meadows,
provided that he so constructs his races or
the ground is so situated that any sur-
plus will return again into the natural
channel before it reaches the occupant
below him, and provided that the flow of
water which the occupant below was pre-
viously entitled to the use of is not mater-
ially diminished. Where he goes beyond
this, even for watering his meadows, he
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must release the right to do so from the
occupants of the stream below or he sub-
jects himself to a suit for damages. Mil-
ler v. Miller, 9 Pa. 74.
Collins conveyed the water away in a
pipe and as the stream wa.s a small spring
run it must have materially diminished
the flow. The water was not used for agri-
cultural purposes and he is therefore liable
in damages.
Judgment for plaintiff for damages sus-
tained.
THORNE, J.
MOSER vs. KERPER.
Inter retation, lex loci contractus-?em-
edy, lex fori- When procedure is made
part of contract-Statute of limitations
-Acts of March 27, 1713 and June 26,
1895.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Jacob Kerper, on August 11th, 1890,
made a note for $470.00 in Iowa, payable
to plaintiff three months after date with
interest at eight per cent. The statute of
limitations of Iowa allowed four years on
which to sue on a contract. It avoided non-
negotiable notes unless the consideration
was expressed, or the words "value re-
ceived" were written in them. In the
note there was no mention of considera-
tion. The court told the jury the action
having begun five years and eleven
months after the note became payable,
that action was barred; that if it was not,
only six per cent. interest could be col-
lected on it and the note was valid, Mo-
tion for a new trial.
WILLIAMSON and GRoss for plaintiffi
The statute of limitations as it affects
the remedy is to be applied according to the
lexfori. Watson v. Brewster, 1 Pa. 381 ;
Building and Loan Association v. Stock-
ton, 148 Pa. 146.
Act of June 26, 1895, does not apply to
causes of action which have accrued prior
to its passage. Shinn v. Healy, 23 C. C.
123; Metz v. Hipps, 96 Pa. 15.
Wright for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This motion for a new trial involves a
consideration of two general points: first,
the law by which the validity of contracts
is tested and the law by which they are
enforced; second, can this contract be en-
forced in Pennsylvania although unen-
forcible in Iowa?
The general principle adopted by civi-
lized countries and states is that the
nature, validity and interpretation of a
contract are governed by the law of the
state or country where the contract is
made or is to be executed; but the remedies
are governed by the laws of the state or
country where enforcement of the contract
is sought i. e. by the lexfori. In other
words the obligations of the parties to a
contract are expounded by the lex loci con-
tractus, but actions brought to enforce
them either in the state where made or in
other states are subject to the means
pointed out by the law of the state in
which the action is instituted. The cases
of Andrews et al v. Herriot, 4 Cowen, 508,
and Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johnson (N. Y.)
238, serve to illustrate the principle. In
the former it was held that an action of
covenant would not lie in New York on a
contract to be performed in Pennsylvania,
where a scroll and the word seal were
used instead of a seal, although the law of
Pennsylvania recognizes such scroll as a
seal.
In Warren v. Lynch, an instrument
was executed in Virginia with a scroll,
but payable in New York, and which was
regarded by the laws of Virginia as a
sealed instrument, was held in New York
to be unsealed, because the laws of the lat-
ter state recognized no instrument as sealed
unless sealed with wax or wafer. Had
the instrument been made payable in Vir-
ginia it would doubtless have been re-
garded as sealed by the courts of New
York. A few of a long list of additional
cases supporting the same view, are 17
Mass. 55; 1 Pa. 381; 58 Pa. 24, and 8
Peters (U. S.) 360. This principld is car-
ried so far that the contract if good in the
state of its inception, is good in another,
even though it would be void had it been
entered in the latter, (1 Grant 51), ex-
cept where domestic policy forbids: 78
Ill. 558; 10 Mich. 283; 13 Pet. (U S.) 519.
It would be a natural sequence that the
settled interpretation put by the court on
the statutes of its own state is followed by
the courts in other states. Case v. Cush-
man, 3 W. & S. 544.
Courts must always determine what ap-
propriately belongs to the contract and
what to the remedy, because they recog-
nize to a certain extent the mode of
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enforcement as a part of Lhe contract
and of the lex loci, when the contract is
presumed to have been made with refer-
ence to such mode. This is the case, es-
pecially, where statutes prescribe a parti-
cular mode of procedure, and is applied
by the Pennsylvania courts on the ground
that all other modes are excluded by the
contract. Thus in the Sea Grove Build-
ing and Loan Association v. Stockton,
148 Pa. 146, where under the law of.N. J.
(Act of March 23, 1881) in order to collect
a debt secured by a bond and mortgage, a
creditor must first foreclose the mortgage
and sell the mortgaged property, and then
if there be any deficiency, he may sue up-
on the bond, provided he begins suit with-
in six months from the date of the said
sale, the court held such a mode of pro-
cedure an incident to the contract and
that it must be applied in an action
brought in a Pennsylvania court. In such
a case the law affected not only the reme-
dy but also the rights of the parties to the
contract. So, too, the right of a surety to
discharge his obligation by a verbal notice
to the creditor to pursue the principal
debtor, when the law of the state where
he became surety requires written notices,
is a matter affecting the obligation of the
contract and is determined by the lex loci
contractus, notwithstanding verbal notice
is a method used in Pennsylvania. Tenant
v. Tenant, 110 Pa. 478.
Since the time within which to bring an
action on a contract is not mutually con-
templated by the parties to it otherwise
than as stipulated therein, it follows that
the statutes of limitation form no part of
the contract itself; hence they affect not
the right but the remedy only. This is
evidenced by the fact that states may
limit the time within which to bring an
action without impairing the obligation of
contracts, if they allow a "reasonable
time" to bring suit on a cause already in
existence. 20 Howard (U. S.) 22.
All the authorities and decisions too are
in harmony on this point. So that an
action brought in Pennsylvania to vindi-
cate a foreign right is governed not by tie
foreign statute, but by the Pennsylvaiia
statute. 2 Kent Cor. 462, 463; 3 Clark,
377; 1 Pa. 381; 6 Pa. C. C. 39. Hence an
action not barred by the laws of the
foreign state is barred in Pennsylvania
provided our statute of limitation has al-
ready run against it, 6 Wall (U. S.) 538,
but such a bar is not necessarily an ex-
tinguishment of the the contract in other
states, especially the state where the con-
tract was nmade. U. S. Bank v. Donnally,
8 Peters (U. S.) 360. Similarly, if the
statute of the state in which the contract
was made has fully run, the aggrieved
party may effectually bring his action in
another state by whose laws the action is
not barred, due regard, of course, being
had for the service of legal process upon
the defendant. 17 Mass. 55; 19 Iowa 531; 3
Johnson, 263; 3 Clark, 377; 1 Pa. 381. It is
sufficient, therefore, if the remedy in Penn-
sylvania is sought within the time pre-
scribed by the Pennsylvania laws and not
by the Iowa laws.
This brings us to apply the law to the
case in hand. The act of March 27, .1713,
limits the time within which to bring an
action on a contract to six years. Action
having been begun five years eleven
months after the note became payable, it
is clear that it is brought within the statu-
tory time, regardless of the Iowa statute.
If the note was valid at its inception in
Iowa, it is still valid here, and this is the
conclusion drawn from the statement of
facts. The Iowa law avoids non-negoti-
able notes unless the consideration is ex-
pressed or the words "value received"
are written therein. The facts expressly
reveal that no mention ot consideration
is made, but are silent as to the words
" value received," thus leading to the
single conclusion that the note contains
such a phrase; and since either the ex-
pression of the consideration or the words
" value received" satisfy the Iowa law,
the note is valid. The inference is like-
wise drawn that the note is payable in
Iowa inasmuch as no place of payment is
mentioned; 6 Wharton 331; 135 Pa. 173.
But it is suggested that the Act of June
26th, 1895, barring a cause of action al-
ready fully barred by the lawsof the state
in which said action arose, is a complete
defence to this cause. Suffice it to say
that this act would be unconstitutional
and void if it were applied to this as well
as to other causes existing at the date of
its passage, and it has been so decided in
Shinn v. Healy, 23 Pa. C. C. 123. Statutes
which do not allow a reasonable time
within which to bring existing causes of
action are in violation of the clause in
Article 1, Section 10, of the U. S. Consti-
tution, providing that no other state shall
pass any "ex-post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts." Cooly
on Constitutional law, section 365, 366;
64 Pa. 5.5 ; 96 Pa. 15 ; 95 U.S. 628 ; Trickett
on Limitation, page 211, section 166.
From the foregoing, it is evident that
the amount of interest collectible on the
note will depend upon the rate of interest
agreed upon in the note, if that be not
above the rate allowed by the Iowa law;
but this will be properlyconsidered in the
new trial. It is enough to award a new
trial, that the court erred in telling the
jury that the action is barred. Motion
for a new trial made absolute.
HOUSER, J.
